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Prospect Theory and Tax Evasion: A Reconsideration of the Yitzhaki Puzzle

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Abstract

puzzle

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JEL Classification

Keywords

Acknowledgements

1 Introduction

et al

et al.

et al

sensitive

insensitive

R

$n =$

$$R = (c) + [1] (n)$$

Diminishing sensitivity

[

Proposition 2 Assume $t > 0$ and $x = 0$. Then:

(i) assuming DARA, there exists a threshold level e_t such that, at an interior maximum, $\frac{\partial x}{\partial t} > 0$ for $t < e_t$ and $\frac{\partial x}{\partial t} < 0$ for $t > e_t$.

(ii) assuming diminishing sensitivity, there exists a threshold level $e_{t,DS}$ such that, at an interior maximum, $\frac{\partial x}{\partial t} > 0$ for

$$= c + [1 \quad]^n = [1 \quad] + [\quad 1]$$

$$t^2 e_t e_{t,DS}$$

$$= [1 \quad]$$

Corollary 2 If e_t is the expected value of the gamble, or if $e_t = [1 \quad]$ as in Hashimzade et al. (in press), then $e_t = 0$ whether or not diminishing sensitivity is assumed.

3.3 Endogenous Audit Probability

$$\begin{aligned} & 0 \\ & = 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$2 [0 \ 1]$$

$$p = (c) + [1 \quad] (n)$$

$$= ()$$

$$p = [\quad] \begin{matrix} h & h \\ [1 &] \end{matrix} + 1 \begin{matrix} i & i \\ (1) \end{matrix}$$

$$[\quad] \begin{matrix} h & h \\ [1 &] \end{matrix} + 1 \begin{matrix} i & i \\ (1) \end{matrix} + [1 \quad] \begin{matrix} i & i \\ (1) \end{matrix} = 0$$

et al

et al

Proposition 4 *Assume endogenous reference dependence, with $\beta = [1 \quad]$, homogeneous of degree*

4 Conclusion

References

Journal of Public Economics

of Public Economics

Journal

Illicit Activity: The Economics of Crime and Tax Fraud

Economics Letters

Economic Theory

Letters

Economics

Journal of Economic Perspectives

Psychology

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FinanzArchiv

Econometrica

Choices, Values, and Frames

of Socio-Economics

Journal

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Econometrica

Public Finance Review

International Economic Review

Economic Inquiry

Journal of Public Economics

Journal of Economic

Theory

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

National Tax Journal

Journal of Public

Economics

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1.
 $\binom{n}{c} - \binom{n}{c-1}$

$$\binom{n}{c} - \binom{n}{c-1} = 0$$

$$= \frac{1}{c} \frac{\binom{n}{c} - \binom{n}{c-1}}{\binom{n}{c-1} + \binom{n}{c}} = 0$$

Proof of Proposition 5.

() =

$$= [\text{ }^c \text{ } [\text{ }]] + [1 \text{ }] [\text{ }^n]$$

$$^0 [\text{ }] + \text{ } 1 = \frac{[\text{ }^0 [\text{ }] \text{ }]}{\text{ } }$$

$$\text{ } = \frac{\text{ }^0 [\text{ }] + \text{ } 1}{\text{ } }$$

$$= \text{ } 0$$

$$\text{ } = \frac{[\text{ }^0 [\text{ }] \text{ }]}{\text{ } } = \frac{\text{ } }{[\text{ }]}$$